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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 16/03/2004

Accident number: 342

Accident time: 13:05

Accident Date: 23/08/2000

Where it occurred: Jahorina, Palosevina

Country: Bosnia Herzegovina

Primary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Secondary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Class: Missed-mine accident
ID original source: NH/AA/ZV

Date of main report: 28/08/2000
Name of source: BiH MAC

Organisation: Name removed
Mine/device: PMA-3 AP blast

Ground condition: grass/grazing area
metal fragments
rocks/stones
soft

Date record created: 21/02/2004

Date last modified: 21/02/2004

No of victims: 1

No of documents: 2

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system: GR: 42525 44805

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale:

Map series:
Map sheet: 526-3-1

Map edition:
Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate investigation (?)
mine/device found in "cleared" area (?)
metal-detector not used (?)
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Accident report
The following is the MAC’s Accident report, edited for anonymity.

INTRODUCTION
A Board of Inquiry was convened by BH MAC Director to investigate the circumstances of
deminer's accident that happened August 23th, on mountain Jahorina, location Palosevina, at
a demining site of [Demining group] organisation, where deminer [the Victim] had suffered
injuries.
Members of the Board of Inquiry were as follows:
BHMAC Chairman
F MAC Member
RS MAC Member
BHMAC received information about deminer's accident by phone from [the Demining goup]
organisation on August 23rd at 14,00 hrs, while the initial report was provided August 24th at
08,30 hrs.
In compliance with the BH Standard, BoI visited the site where the accident happened the
very same day at 15,38 hrs. Members of the BoI had immediately talked with the director of
the organisation, team leader, monitor and deminer No. 2. BoI took the written statements of
the personnel that were present at the site.

SEQUENCE, DOCUMENTATION AND TASKING PROCEDURES
[The Demining group] organization was tasked with the ID 1000277 Palosevina, Jahorina,
starting work July 18th 2000. Map used for the task was a JNA one, sheet 526-3-1, grid
references x=42525 and y=44805. Task was set by RS MAC and financed through the
International Trust Fund (ITF). Priority to this task was given on request of the Olympic
Committee Jahorina in order to reconstruct the powerlines from the direction of Dvoriste
location. Integral demining methods where used while demining: use of EDD teams,
mechanical preparation of the ground along with the manual demining operations. Three
teams were involved in demining operations for this task.
Red Folder for this task contains the sketch of the minefield and an interview with war
activities participant, [name excised], who was a member of the RS Army engineering unit
that took part in mining this part of Jahorina. This participant confirmed the mined area.
The minefield was set by RS Army in order to protect military radar facilities referred in JNA
documentation as object No 5.

SITE LAYOUT AND MARKING
Site layout is done in compliance with BH Standard and the [Demining group] organisation
SOP.
Marking of the site was done properly. Pickets of a proper height for setting the border
between the safe lane and the suspect area are flushed into the ground at a proper distance
from each other, connected with the mine tape at ground level. Designated areas are properly
marked as well.

QUALITY ASSURANCE
No faults were found by the inspectors of Regional Office Pale in their work prior to accident.
Safe lane is two metres wide, with a proper 10 cm overlap from each side, marked as
properly as the terrain conditions allowed.
The BH MAC approved SOP was available at the site.
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There were 10 RO Pale inspections conducted on this site since the task is opened on July
18 2000.

GEOGRAPHY AND WEATHER
Since the site is location very high in the mountains, the weather was very suitable for
demining operations regardless of the fact that it is summer. Team C in which the accident
happened has worked on this site since August 20th. The exact location where the accident
happen is of a very soft soil and very suitable for the use of the prodder. Location of the site
itself was partially contaminated with metal fragments due to NATO attacks few years ago
which made the use of metal detector hard. About 600m2 were cleared on this site for the
period of three to four days. Vegetation contains of very dense grass and the terrain is
partially rocky. ( Rocks and stones scattered over the site due to NATO attacks.)
Yellow tipped pickets are places in working lanes as a sign for previously found mines. (217
mines found up to the day of the accident, out of which there were 43 PMA -1 ; 169 PMA – 3;
2 PMR-2A ; 2 PMA-2; 1 MRUD and 1 UXO). The accident happened on previously cleared
ground, 30 cm from the border of the safe lane. (missed mine).
There is a damaged water tower in the very vicinity of the site, along with two big cavities that
were also a result of NATO attacks.
Site can be accessed from a non-asphalt road. All designated areas are set on this road:
control point/safe area, resting area, area for the medic and the ambulance, area for the metal
detector check, as well as the area for EDD teams.

MEDICAL COVERAGE
As soon as the medic approached the wounded deminer, he provided the first emergency aid
and organised his transport to the Kasindol hospital for further medical treatment. As for this
moment, we know that [the Victim] has lost his left foot. The entire medical treatment was
conducted very efficiently.

EQUIPMENT AND TOOLS
Equipment and tools used by the team are as follows: Ebinger metal detectors, prodders,
spades, shears, helmets with visor and protective jackets. Detectors have been checked
during investigation as well. Deminers re-checked the cleared area prior to BoI visit with the
detector and a prodder in order to enable them access the accident site.
Prodder used by the members of the team was suitable regarding to the terrain that was
demined. On the very day of the accident it was possible to prod very easily to the depth of 10
cm into the ground.
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[The Victim’s boot is shown above. It is a Welco blast boot designed to be worn with
overboots. The overboots were not worn in this instance. These pictures were not included in
the original report.]

EVIDENCE OF MINING / RE-MINING
There is no evidence of re-mining at the stated location.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
Pale Police station was also informed about the accident. They conducted their own
investigation one day after the acccident happened, on August 24th. They have asked that
they are provided with the copy of the Board of Inquiry report when finished.
At the wider Jahorina area there were two [civilian] mine accidents and one demining
accident.

BOARD OF INQUIRY NOTES
Board of Inquiry visited the site of the accident escorted by C-1 team leader. After the visit
was finished, it was concluded that the accident was the result of the activation of PMA-3
mine (leftovers found). Mine was buried into the ground.
Demining accident involved one deminer who suffered from the injuries to his left foot. He was
immediately evacuated to Kasindol hospital where he was received and operated on.
Members of the BoI have paid the injured a visit in the Kasindol hospital.
The injured [Victim] has stated the following: On the day of the accident and just after the
break from 12,00 to 13,00 hrs, he finished his working lane started the same day using
prodder. After he finished the lane, he started to pick out the stakes from the upper part of the
working lane.
When he moved downwards in his lane, he stepped on the mine. As he states, his first
thought was that he slipped and stepped on a mine under the mine tape, since the mine
stepped on was quite close to the tape. However, during first aid treatment though which he
was conscious all the time, he realised that the mine was in the part of the lane already
cleared.
As [the Victim] states, he cannot understand how did it happen that he missed the mine,
especially since there were many mines around which require very careful and cautious work.

RECCOMMENDATIONS
Because of the fact that the mine was missed, i.e activated on the cleared area, Board of
Inquiry reccommended the re-clearance of the area cleared at the part of the site where
accident happened (cleared by team C).
According to BH Standard, RS MAC will ask that [the Demining group] organisation conduct
final quality control of the rest of the site up to 5%.
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Director BHMAC is to organise a meeting to be attended by an authorised ITF representative
along with the management of [the Demining group] organisation. This meeting should for its
topic have the discussion about the accident mentioned and should result in adequate
conclusions as well.
[The Demining group] organisation is to conduct one day re-training of deminers and
management regarding the cause that lead to the accident.

ANNEXES: [Not made available: some pictures were.]
A
Initial report,
B
Board of Inquiry Members
C
Written statements of personnel present at site
D
Survey report with the sketch of the site and the sketch of the accident site.
E
Photographs of the site and the location of accident.
F
Inspectors' reports
Signed: members of the BOI

Victim Report
Victim number: 430

Name: Name removed
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: not known

Compensation: not made available
(insurance)

Time to hospital: not recorded

Protection issued: Not recorded

Protection used: not recorded

Summary of injuries:
AMPUTATION/LOSS
Leg Below knee
COMMENT
See Medical Report.

Medical Report
No formal medical report was made available.
In May 2002 a MAC representative reported that the victim had been fitted with a prosthesis
but remained out of work. He was reported to be “taking legal action to obtain additional
compensation in a ‘continental scale’ dispute“.

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a “Field control inadequacy” because the Victim
stepped on a mine in an area that was supposed to be clear. Either the clearance was not
done properly or the method used was inappropriate.
The accident report was unusually brief for this theatre and did not record the length of time it
took for the Victim to reach a surgical facility or provide any details of the injury suffered. More
importantly, no suggestions for changes so that a repetition could be avoided were made.
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The use of the Welco blast boot (a donation to the region) did not reduce the Victim’s injuries.
A MAC representative reported that it could not be worn with the overboot (as designed)
because of the uneven terrain. This full boot (with overboot) have been shown to be of some
protection when stepping on a mine as small as a PMA-3. However, it has not been shown to
be of any value when stepping on the PMA-1 or PMA-2 mines that are also common in the
region. Source: US Army Communications - Electronics Command Night Vision Electronic
Sensors Directorate, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-5806 - Final Report of the Lower Extremity
Assessment Program (LEAP - 99-2), August 2000 - carried out by the US Army Institute of
Surgical Research, Extremity Trauma Study Branch, Fort Sam Houston, TX 78234-6315
The injuries resulting from stepping on a PMA-3 in ordinary footwear vary from traumatic
amputation to minor bruising. The picture below shows why this happens. It shows a cut-away
section through a PMA-3. The 35g Tetryl is in the top and centre of the mine. The area of
pressure-plate surrounding the HE is actually larger than the area of pressure-plate over it. If
a victim is fortunate, they step on the pressure plate but the explosive charge is not beneath
their foot.

Related papers
The following is a MAC “lesson’s learned” document made available in 2002 (edited for
anonymity). The “Trial test” of the Welco blast boots referenced in Conclusion No.4 is
reported by the MAC to have been no more than the free issue of the boots to a local
company. No record of use, or mechanism for follow up, was in place.

September 4th 2000: MAC QA

LESSON LEARNED – DEMINING ACCIDENT AUGUST 23rd 2000
INTRODUCTION
The Board of Inquiry was convened by BH MAC to conduct the investigation of the demining
accident, in compliance with BH Standard; the accident occurred August 23rd 2000, Pale
municipality, location of Jahorina – Paloševina. One deminer got injured in this accident lost
his left foot.

SUMMARY
Accident occurred at 12.55 hrs on August 23rd 2000, immediately after the team started to
work after their lunch break. The organisation formed their deminers to work as two-men
teams. Deminer in the working lane was searching the area using his prodder. When he
finalised his search and finished the working lane, he started to collect the mine tape from the
left side of the lane, walking the ”cleared” working lane. That is where he activated with his left
foot PMA-3 mine by stepping on it. PMA-3 mine was buried. The injured was evacuated to the
Kasindol hospital where he was operated on.

CONCLUSIONS
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Based on what is stated above, the Board of Inquiry reached the following conclusions:
1. Tasked area is covered with scattered stones (due to NATO bombing). Since the area is
very much contaminated with metal fragments, it was hard to use metal detector. Only
prodding was used in demining lane where the accident occurred. The prodder itself is
suitable for the type of terrain and it can prod to the depth of 10 cm without too much
pressure.
2. The mine mentioned is missed in the working lane.
3. Tasked area is extremely hard to clear, which resulted in its organisation in two-men
teams, since the metal detector could not be used for quality control.
4. The injured deminer wore the incomplete protective boots system which was on a trial test
in the demining organisation.
Tasked area is very densely mined. 217 mines were found up to the moment of the accident.

RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on what is stated above, and in order to prevent further accidents, the Board of Inquiry
recommends the following:
Constant supervision of compliance with the procedures is needed in order to prevent the
deminer miss a mine in the working lane (base stick, prodding at every 2.5 cm, advancing).
When working with prodder, theoretical productivity for ground category A is 6.3m2, without
missing a mine.
When mines are very densely laid in an area and if it is not possible to use the detector, the
deminer’s shift in the working lane should be shortened, breaks frequent and longer than
usual, which will improve his concentration within the working lane.
Due to the fact that the mine is “missed”, i.e. activated on the “cleared” area, the Board of
Inquiry recommends re-clearance of the cleared area at the part of the site where the
accident had occurred (the part of the task where C-team worked where 600m2 were
cleared).
The demining organisation is to conduct a one-day additional training for both deminers and
the management of the organisation, related to procedures of work in working lanes on the
very particular site that disables the use of metal detector or at least diminishes it.
Signed: AD Coordination
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